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Abstract
We present a new concern when collecting data from individuals that arises from the attempt to
mitigate privacy leakage in multiple reporting: tracking of users participating in the data collection
via the mechanisms added to provide privacy. We present several definitions for untrackable
mechanisms, inspired by the differential privacy framework.
Specifically, we define the trackable parameter as the log of the maximum ratio between the
probability that a set of reports originated from a single user and the probability that the same set of
reports originated from two users (with the same private value). We explore the implications of this
new definition. We show how differentially private and untrackable mechanisms can be combined to
achieve a bound for the problem of detecting when a certain user changed their private value.
Examining Google’s deployed solution for everlasting privacy, we show that RAPPOR (Erlingsson
et al. ACM CCS, 2014) is trackable in our framework for the parameters presented in their paper.
We analyze a variant of randomized response for collecting statistics of single bits, Bitwise
Everlasting Privacy, that achieves good accuracy and everlasting privacy, while only being reasonably
untrackable, specifically grows linearly in the number of reports. For collecting statistics about
data from larger domains (for histograms and heavy hitters) we present a mechanism that prevents
tracking for a limited number of responses.
We also present the concept of Mechanism Chaining, using the output of one mechanism as
the input of another, in the scope of Differential Privacy, and show that the chaining of an ε1-LDP
mechanism with an ε2-LDP mechanism is ln e
ε1+ε2+1
eε1+eε2 -LDP and that this bound is tight.
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1 Introduction
The cure should not be worse than the disease. In this paper we raise the issue that
mechanisms for Differentially Private data collection enable the tracking of users. This
wouldn’t be the first time an innocent solution for an important problem is exploited for the
purposes of tracking. Web cookies, designed to let users maintain a session between different
web pages, is now the basis of many user tracking implementations. In the Differential
Privacy world, we examine how various solutions meant to protect the privacy of users over
long periods of time actually enable the tracking of participants.
To better understand this, consider the following scenario: A browser developer might
wish to learn what which are the most common homepages, for caching purposes, or perhaps
to identify suspiciously popular homepages that might be an evidence for the spreading of a
new virus. They develop a mechanism for collecting the URLs of users’ homepages. Being
very privacy aware, they also make sure that the data sent back to them is Differentially
Private. They want to ensure they can collect this data twice a day without allowing someone
with access to the reports to figure out the homepage of any individual user.
If fresh randomness is used to generate each differentially private report, then the danger
is that information about the users homepage would be revealed eventually to someone who
follows the user’s reports. We strive to what we call “Everlasting Privacy”, the property of
maintaining privacy no matter how many collections were made. In our example, the users
achieve everlasting privacy by correlating the answers given at each collection time: e.g. a
simple way is that each user fixes the randomness they use, and so sends the same report at
each collection.
Now consider Alice, a user who reports from her work place during the day and from
her home during the evening. At every collection, Alice always reports regarding the same
homepage2, and therefore (since the randomness was fixed) sends identical reports at home
and at work. An eavesdropper examining a report from the work IP address and a report
from Alice’s home IP address would notice that they are the same, while if they examined a
report generated by Alice and one generated by Bob (with the same homepage) they will
very likely be different. This allows the adversary to find out where Alice lives.
To elaborate, correlation based solutions open the door to the new kind of issue, tracking
users. The correlation between reports can be used as an instrument of identifying individuals,
in particular it makes the decision problem of whether or not two sets of reports originated from
the same user much easier. This concern has been suggested by the RAPPOR project [13] but
without a formal definition, or analysis in the framework where their solution was provided.
The problem of tracking users is related to the problem of point change detection, i.e.
identifying when a stream of samples switched from one distribution to another. While
this problem has been researched in the past under the lens of privacy by Cummings et
al. [5, 4], these works focused on private release of point change detection, i.e. how to enable
researchers to detect changes in the sampled distribution while not being too reliant on any
specific sample. Our goal is different. We wish to prevent change point detection as much
as we can; as in our case, a change in distribution correlates to a change in private value.
Detecting a change in private value jeopardizes the privacy of the user (think of a case where
the gender is changed).
2 The reader may be wondering why bother reporting about the same value if it does not change. For
instance it may for purposes of aggregating information about the currently online population.
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1.1 Our Contributions
The main conceptual contribution of this work is the definition of reports being untrackable,
presented in Section 3. Roughly, the definition states that the distribution on outputs
generated by a single user needs to be sufficiently close to that generated by two users. For
the discussion on motivation and possible variants see Section 3.4
I Definition 1 (informal). A mechanism M is (γ, δ)-Untrackable for k reports, if for any k
reports
Pr [Reports were generated by one user] ≤ eγPr [Reports were generated by two users]+δ.
We present a formal definition to Everlasting Privacy. Roughly speaking, a mechanism is
(γ, δ)-Everlasting Privacy if executing it any number of times is (γ, δ)-DP. Our main goal is to
simultaneously achieve both tracking prevention and everlasting privacy, while maintaining
a reasonable accuracy for the global statistics. We explore the implications of this new
definition, specifically how it composes and what a fixed state that is reported in a noisy
manner can achieve.
We describe how our tracking definitions can be extended to the change point detection
framework, namely to bound the probability that a change in the user’s private value is
ever detected. In that section we also discuss the necessity of correlating answers between
data collections to ensure Differential Privacy, and define various general constructions for
mechanisms that can achieve this Everlasting Differential Privacy.
As a tool for analyzing such constructions, in Section 4 we prove a theorem about running
a Local Differential Privacy mechanism on the output of another such mechanism.
I Theorem 2 (informal). A mechanism that consists of running an ε2-LDP mechanism on
the result of an ε1-LDP mechanism results in 12ε1 · ε2-LDP for small ε1 and ε2.
Theorem 20 and Corollary 21 provide the formal statement and proof.
We then continue to analyze Google RAPPOR’s [13] performance under the framework
of tracking. We show the pure tracking bound RAPPOR achieves as well as estimate its
“average” case performance. We cocnslude that according to our definition of untrackable,
RAPPOR achieves poor protection guarantees. This is presented in Section 5.
As a warm up, in Section 6 we present a mechanism that deals with data collection of
a single private bit from each participant. One can view it as the extension of randomized
response in this setting. Each user generates a bit at random and remembers it. At
each collection, the user generates an new bit and sends the XOR of the private bit, the
remembered bit and the new bit. The remembered bit is generated by flipping one biased coin,
parameterized by ε1. The new bits are generated from fresh coin flips from another biased
coin, parameterized by ε2. The aggregator collects all the reports and outputs estimated
frequencies for both 0 and 1. We prove that for a choice of privacy parameters ε1, ε2 < 1,
and for n participating users, the mechanism has the properties:
(i) It is ε1-Everlasting Differentially Private.
(ii) Accuracy: the frequency estimation of 0 and 1 is no further than O˜
(
1
ε1·ε2·
√
n
)
from
the actual values.
(iii) It is bk2 cε2-untrackable for k reports.
In Section 7 we present a mechanism that allows the collection of statistics of users
private values when their data is d bits. This mechanism is particularly relevant for the
problems of heavy hitters estimations and histograms. The mechanism’s state consists of
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the results of the inner product of the private value with multiple vectors in a way that is
Differentially Private, reporting one such vector and the private result of the inner product
at each data collection. The aggregator collects all the reports and produces an estimate for
the frequencies of all possible values, such that the sum of frequencies is 1. We prove that
for a choice of privacy parameters ε < 1, setting the state to consist of L reports, and for n
participating users, the mechanism has the properties:
(i) It is (ε, δ)-Approximate Everlasting Differentially Private.
(ii) The estimation of the frequency of all values is no further than O˜
(
1
ε′
√
d
n
)
from the
actual frequency, for ε′ = ε
2
√
2L ln( 1δ )
.
(iii) It is
(
0, k2L
)
-untrackable.
Concretely, to obtain (ε, δ)-Everlasting Privacy and α accuracy, then for k reports the
guarantee on the mechanism is
(
0, O˜
(
k2
α2ε2n
))
-Untrackable.
Coming up with better bounds or showing the inherent limitations is the main open
direction we propose (see Section 8).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Differential Privacy
For background on Differential Privacy see Dwork and Roth [10] or Vadhan [18].
Throughout most of this paper we consider a variant of Differential Privacy, called Local
Differential Privacy. Local Differential Privacy regards mechanisms where each individual user
runs on their own data to create a report, which is then sent to the server and aggregated there
to produce a population level result. The setting we consider is one where the aggregator
access the users’ data only through a randomized mapping, a mechanism, that has the
following property:
I Definition 3 ([15]). Let ε, δ > 0. A mechanism M : U 7→ O is (ε, δ)-Local Differentially
Private if for every two possible inputs, u, u′ ∈ U , and ∀S ⊆ O, Pr [M (u) ∈ S] ≤ eε ·
Pr [M (u′) ∈ S] + δ.
One of the significant properties of Differential Privacy is the way it composes. Com-
posing two mechanisms that are (ε1, δ1) and (ε2, δ2)-Differentially Private respectively is
(ε1 + ε2, δ1 + δ2)-Differentially Private. A small deterioration in the δ parameter achieves a
great improvement in the ε parameter of the composition.
I Theorem 4 (Advanced composition for Differential Privacy [11]). Let δ′ > 0. The k fold
composition of (ε, δ)-Differentially Private mechanisms is (ε′, kδ + δ′)-Differentially Private
for ε′ =
√
2k ln (1/δ′)ε+ kε (eε − 1).
Another useful property of Differential Privacy is that running any function on the
output of an (ε, δ)-Differentially Private mechanism is (ε, δ)-Differentially Private. That is,
Differential Privacy is closed under post-processing.
When using the same mechanism to collect reports multiple times, if not done carefully,
the privacy guarantee might deteriorate as the number of collections periods grows. We
define Everlasting Differential Privacy as an upper bound on the privacy parameter of a
mechanism, no matter how many times it is executed, as long as the private data had not
changed. Definition 10 formalizes this idea.
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2.2 Background
The need for everlasting privacy became apparent since the early stages of the Differential
Privacy research. As mentioned in Section 2, independent repetitive executions of Differential
Privacy mechanisms inevitably deteriorate the privacy guarantee. While Theorem 4 teaches
us that the privacy guarantee can grow as low as only the square root of the number of
reports, practical implementations might require users to participate in as many as thousands
of data collections (e.g. anything requiring daily reports).
This led researchers to suggest data collection mechanisms that allow numerous data
collections, while maintaining individuals’ privacy. Certain solutions, such as Google’s
RAPPOR [13] and Microsoft’s dBitFLip [6], use the concept of statefulness, maintaining
some data between executions. This enables them to correlate outputs between executions,
which allows for a manageable upper bound of the privacy leakage that does not rely on
the number of collections made. This effectively allows for a privacy guarantee that holds
forever, namely Everlasting Privacy.
Heavy Hitter Mechanisms
Two problems that have been very interesting for data collectors are the histogram and
heavy hitters problems. In the histogram problem the goal is to accurately estimate the
frequencies of all possible values the population might hold. The heavy hitters problem is
about identifying the most common values amongst the population. Both histograms and
heavy hitters in the local model has been researched before by Bassily et al. [2, 1], who used
Hadamard transformations on the users private data that allow users to send succinct reports
to the curator while allowing the required statistics to be generated very efficiently. These
works do not fit our framework, as they intrinsically allow for trackability. In their solution,
each user is associated with a specific piece of some shared randomness. The aggregator
must know to which piece of randomness a specific report belongs to, essentially forcing
their solution to be highly trackable. The techniques used in their paper are similar to the
ones used by Naor et al. [16]. In that work the authors use an inner product mechanism
to identify and ban the most common passwords. This enables the increase in the effective
time an adversary will need to invest in order to guess a user’s password. Their mechanism
maintains Differential Privacy to prevent the leakage of each individual’s password, but it
does not maintain Everlasting Privacy. They also mention a modification to their scheme
achieves Everlasting Privacy, by reusing the same random vector for all future inner products,
but such a solution is highly trackable. The inner product mechanisms used in [2, 1, 16]
were the inspiration of our Noisy Inner Product mechanism presented in 7.
Continual Observation and Pan Privacy
Other models and solutions to long-lasting privacy have been developed as well, such as the
Continual Observation model in [7, 3]. The goal is to maintains differential privacy for values
that change over time, e.g. a counter that updates over time, or streams of data, like traffic
conditions and so on. This solution is in the central, or streaming, model and not in the
local model. Another model is that of Pan Privacy, where the goal is to maintain privacy
even if the internal representation of the secret state is leaked from time to time (Dwork et
al. [8]). In Erlignsson et al. [12] this idea was extended, transforming the mechanism in [7]
to the local model, in order to solve the 1-bit histogram problem, and thus achieving privacy
over extended periods of time. The transformation means that every user reports genuinely
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only once throughout all data collections, thus resulting in accuracy that relies linearly in
the number of times their value changed. This suggests that accuracy will drop as collection
times increase.
Joseph et al. [14] suggested an approach where at the beginning, a global update occurs,
where each individual participates in a private histogram estimation. At each subsequent
potential collection time, each user compares their current contribution to the histogram
compared to the last time a global update occurs. Depending on how different it is, they
are more likely to suggest that another global update occurs. If enough users vote in favor,
the curator initiates another round of global update, creating a more accurate histogram.
This solution allows for collections to be made from users only when it is likely that the
previously computed output is no longer accurate, greatly increasing the privacy guarantee
of individuals. On the other hand, their accuracy analysis relies on the existence of a small
number of user types, where all users of the same type behave identically.
3 Stateful Mechanisms and Tracking
Consider a mechanism for users to report their values to a center.Such mechanisms may be
stateless, i.e. ones that receive an input and (probabilistically) produce an output, or stateful
mechanisms, ones that receive in addition to the input a state and produce in addition to an
output a state for the next execution. The power of stateful mechanisms is that they enable
the correlation of outputs between different executions through the states passed from one
execution to the next.
3.1 Definitions of Mechanisms and Report Stream Generators
Stateless mechanisms are randomized mappings for which each execution is independent of
the others. Stateless mechanisms receive the user’s data and publicly available information,
namely auxiliary information, and output a report. The publicly available information can be
anything known to all parties, like time of day, value of some publicly accessible counter, etc.
I Definition 5 (Stateless Mechanism). A stateless mechanism M is a randomized mapping
from a user’s data and auxiliary information to the domain of reports, M : U ×A×{0, 1}? 7→
R. In our setting it is used to generate a stream of reports, r1, r2, . . ., where each report is
generated independently.
Stateless mechanisms might provide very poor everlasting privacy, as each iteration reveals
more information about the user’s data.
Therefore, to achieve everlasting privacy one must correlate the reports sent by the user(s)
(see for instance [9] where this is proved for counting queries). For this we define Stateful
Mechanisms, where the mechanism maintains a state that is updated with each call to the
mechanism.
I Definition 6 (Fully Stateful Mechanism). A fully stateful mechanism M is a randomized
mapping from a user’s data, current state and auxiliary information to the domain of reports
and to a new state, M : U × S ×A×{0, 1}? 7→ R× S. In our setting it is used to generate a
stream of reports r1, r2, . . . and a stream of states s0 = ⊥, s1, . . ., such that each pair of state
and report are generated by the previous state, auxiliary information and the user’s data,
ri, si =M (u, si−1, ai−1).
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Notice that the execution number and all previous outputs can be encoded into the state. A
fully stateful mechanism can achieve everlasting privacy by correlating answers using the
data stored in the state. For example, it can execute a DP mechanism on the user’s data
and remember the result, reporting the same result whenever queried.
One shortcoming of correlating the reports in such a manner is that it might be used as
an identifier by an adversary, potentially allowing the adversary to identify that a group of
reports all originated from the same user, thus allowing tracking other activities of the user
(see Section 3.2).
We define Permanent State Mechanisms as mechanisms that maintain the same state
once set, i.e. s1 = s2 = s3.... As we shall see, such mechanisms are very convenient to work
with and have good properties wrt composition.
Report stream generators (RSG) are mappings that use mechanisms to generate a stream
of reports. The responsibility of the RSG is to get the user’s data and iteratively call the
mechanism.
I Definition 7 (Stateless Report Stream Generator). For a domain of user data U , a range of
reports R, and a report stream size n, a Stateless Report Stream Generator using a stateless
mechanism M is a mapping GMn : U 7→ Rn, that acquires the auxiliary information required
at each step and calls M to generate the reports r1, . . . , rn.
Similarly, stateful RGSs use fully stateful mechanisms to generate the stream of reports.
I Definition 8 (Stateful Report Stream Generator). For a domain of user data U , a range
of reports R, and a report stream size n, a Stateful Report Stream Generator using a fully
stateful mechanism M is a mapping GMn : U 7→ Rn, that acquires the auxiliary information
required at each step and calls M with the state of the current step to generate report ri and
the next step’s state si.
3.2 Everlasting Privacy and Tracking
The problem we focus on is the ability of an adversary to distinguish whether or not a set of
reports originated from a single user or by two users (or more, see Section 3.4). For example,
If an adversary had two sets of reports belonging to two different IP addresses, the adversary
could learn if those IP addresses belong to the same user or not (potentially identifying the
user’s work place or home address). The definition of untrackable we propose is inspired by
definition of Differential Privacy.
I Definition 9. For a domain of user data U , a range of reports R and a report stream size
k, a report stream generator GMk is (γ, δ)-untrackable if for all user data u ∈ U , for all
subsets of indices J ⊆ [k], J{ = [k] \ J and ∀T ⊆ Rk we have:
Pr
[
GMk (u) ∈ T
] ≤ eγ · Pr [GM|J| (u) ∈ TJ] · Pr [GMk−|J| (u) ∈ TJ{]+ δ
and
Pr
[
GM|J| (u) ∈ TJ
]
· Pr
[
GMk−|J| (u) ∈ TJ{
]
≤ eγ · Pr [GMk (u) ∈ T ]+ δ.
For report stream generators that are (γ, δ)-untrackable, an adversary has only a small
advantage in distinguishing between the following two cases: the reports originated from a
single user or two users. A discussion for the idea behind this definition and its benefits can
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be found in Section 3.4. If we want this property to hold for any possible output (i.e. always
have the ambiguity), then we can demand that the mechanism be (γ, 0)-untrackable. We
call such mechanisms γ-untrackable. We leverage the similarity to DP show composition
theorems on untrackable mechanisms.
Everlasting Privacy is meant to limit the leakage of information users suffer, no matter
how many executions a mechanism had. For the following definitions let T be a collection of
report streams. For a set of indices J let TJ be the collection of partial report stream, where
the reports taken are those in indices J .
I Definition 10 (Everlasting Privacy). For a domain of user data U , a range of reports R,
a report stream generator GMk is (ε, δ)-Everlasting Privacy if for all user data u, u′ ∈ U ,
for all report stream size k and for all sets of output streams T ⊆ Rk, Pr [GMk (u) ∈ T ] ≤
eεPr
[
GMk (u′) ∈ T
]
+ δ.
If a mechanism is (ε, 0)-Everlasting Privacy we say it is ε-Everlasting Privacy.
These definitions are tightly related to the problem of change-point detection. We define
undetectability similarly to untrackability, only we do not assume both report sets originated
from the same private data:
I Definition 11. For a domain of user data U , a range of reports R and a report stream
size k, a report stream generator GMk is (γ, δ)-undetectable if for all pairs of user data
u, u′ ∈ U , for all subsets of indices J ⊆ [k], J{ = [k] \ J and ∀T ⊆ Rk we have:
Pr
[
GMk (u) ∈ T
] ≤ eγ · Pr [GM|J| (u) ∈ TJ] · Pr [GMk−|J| (u′) ∈ TJ{]+ δ
and
Pr
[
GM|J| (u) ∈ TJ
]
· Pr
[
GMk−|J| (u′) ∈ TJ{
]
≤ eγ · Pr [GMk (u) ∈ T ]+ δ.
We can now connect being untrackable and everlasting privacy with being undetectable.
I Theorem 12. A mechanism that is (γ, δ)-untrackable and (ε, δ′)-everlasting differentially
private is also (γ + ε, δmax)-undetectable, for δmax = max {eεδ + δ′, δ + eγδ′}.
The proof for this theorem can be found in the full version of the paper.
3.3 Tracking Bounds, Composition Theorems and Generalizations
For the special case of Permanent State Mechanisms, we can show an upper bound on
the untrackable parameter. If the mechanism is ε-Differentially Private in its state, i.e.
the mechanism protects the privacy of the state, then the untrackable parameter grows
linearly in ε:
I Theorem 13. A Permanent state mechanism whose reports are generated by an ε-
Differentially Private mechanism receiving the state as its input is
⌊
k
2
⌋
ε-untrackable for
k reports.
The proof for this theorem can be found in the full version of the paper.
An important question is how tracking composes, i.e. how does a user’s participation
in multiple Report Stream Generators affect his untrackable guarantees. The similarity
between the definition of untrackability and differential privacy allows us to apply results
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regarding the latter to obtain results on the former. We show an advanced composition for
untrackable mechanisms that is analogous to advanced composition for differential privacy [11]
and Theorem 4.
I Theorem 14 (Advanced composition for untrackability). Let m be a positive integer. Let
{Mi}i∈[m] be m mechanisms that are (γ, δ)-untrackable for ki reports respectively. The
composition of these mechanisms, M̂ , is (γ′,mδ + δ′)-untrackable for
γ′ =
√
2m ln (1/δ′) · γ +m · γ (eγ − 1) .
The proof for this theorem, as well as the formal definition of composition, can be found in A.1
Another important question is what can be said about the untrackable guarantees in the
settings where the reports are split into more than two sets, i.e. when we want to answer the
question whether some reports were generated by a single user or any number of users. For
this we define untrackable for n users for k reports.
I Definition 15 (Multiple User Untrackable). For a domain of user data U , a range of reports
R and a report stream size k, and n users, a report stream generator GMk is γ-multiple user
untrackable if for all user data u ∈ U , all partitions P = {Pi}i∈[n] of [k] into n parts, and
all output stream sets T ⊆ Rk:
e−γ ≤
∏
j∈[n] Pr
[
GM|Pj | (u) ∈ TPj
]
Pr
[
GMk (u) ∈ T
] ≤ eγ .
We show two connections between Definitions 9 and 15: the first is a general bound, essentially
saying that the untrackable parameter increases linearly in the number of users.
I Theorem 16. A mechanism that is γ-untrackable for k reports, is (n− 1) γ-multiple user
untrackable for n users for k reports.
We can significantly improve this bound for permanent state mechanisms by leveraging the
fact that their untrackable parameter is linear in the number of reports used.
I Theorem 17. A permanent state mechanism M , whose reports are generated by an ε-
Differentially Private mechanism receiving the state as its input, is dlogne⌊k2 ⌋ε-multiple user
untrackable for n users for k reports.
The proofs of these theorems can be found in Section A.2 and A.3
3.4 Discussion
The way we defined untrackable is not the only one possible. The “typical” attack we wish
to prevent is against an adversary that sees many sets of reports and tries to identify two
that belong to the same user. However, making this the basis of a definition might result in
weak guarantees, as it disregards any prior information that an adversary might have. The
adversary might know that Alice only lives in one of two houses, and only tries to identify
where she lives. Our definition is designed to protect against exactly this kind of attacker,
who only tries to distinguish whether a stream of reports was generated by Alice, or partly
by Alice and partly by Bob.
Another natural definition is to prevent distinguishing whether a stream of reports was
generated by any combination of users vs. any other combination of users. Our definition,
though appearing weaker than this one, actually implies it, with some deterioration to the
parameter; Theorem 16 suggests that the parameter deteriorates linearly in the number of
users, while Theorem 15 suggests that in some cases it can deteriorate logarithmically.
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Our definition also implies that it would be hard to decide whether any two reports
were both generated by Alice, or one by Alice and one by Bob. This property might seem
tempting as a basis of an alternative untrackable definition, but it is too weak on its own. A
mechanism that has this property might have very poor protection against adversaries with
access to more than two reports.
Finally, Theorem 12 teaches us that our definition, when combined with everlasting privacy,
naturally extends to the problem of change point (un)detection. That is, a mechanism that
adheres both to the everlasting privacy requirement and our untrackable definition also
protects the fact that a user changed their private value.
In conclusion, This definition is strong enough to protect users against reasonable ad-
versaries, i.e. ones who have some prior knowledge about the locations of users. On the other
hand, while seeming weaker than other definitions it actually implies them. Additionally, as
can be seen in Sections 6 and 7, it is achievable while also allowing for reasonable everlasting
privacy guarantees and accuracy.
4 Mechanism Chaining
In this section we generalize the idea presented in Theorem 13 of using a Differential Privacy
mechanism on the output of another such mechanism. We first provide a formal definition
for this mechanism chaining, and then state and prove two theorems about the Differential
Privacy guarantee achieved by doing such chaining. The first weak, but intuitive, the second
much more powerful and also optimal.
4.1 Definitions
We now present mechanism chaining in three different settings: In the first setting we simply
define the chaining of two mechanisms as taking the output of the first and using it as the
input of the second.
I Definition 18 (2 Local Mechanism Chaining). Given two mechanisms A : U → V and
B : V → O, the chaining of these two mechanismsMB◦A : U → O is defined asMB◦A (u) =
B (A (u)).
The second setting we examine is the chaining of k mechanism, and the third and final
setting is the chaining of k families of mechanisms that are not necessarily local. They are
not relevant for the rest of this paper, but for completeness we present them in the full
version of the paper.
4.2 Differential Privacy Guarantees for Two Mechanism Chaining
We now present a tight bound on the Differential Privacy guarantee of the chaining of two
mechanisms. We begin by presenting the “Basic Chaining Upper Bound”, which is not tight,
but is perhaps more intuitive. We then present a better upper bound called the “Advanced
Chaining Upper Bound”. Basic Chaining simply says that the resulting Differential Privacy
is no worse than the Differential Privacy of either mechanisms.
I Theorem 19 (Basic Chaining). Given two mechanisms A : U → V and B : V → O that
are ε1-LDP and ε2-LDP respectively,MB◦A : U → O is min {ε1, ε2}-LDP.
The advanced chaining bound is always better:
M. Naor and N. Vexler 4:11
I Theorem 20 (Advanced Chaining). Given two mechanisms A : U → V and B : V → O
that are ε1-LDP and ε2-LDP respectively,MB◦A : U → O is ln eε1+ε2+1eε1+eε2 -LDP.
The proof of these theorem can be found in the full version of the paper. The privacy
parameter can be upper bounded by a more simple bound that is meaningful for small ε1
and ε2:
I Corollary 21. Given two mechanisms A : U → V and B : V → O that are ε1-LDP and
ε2-LDP respectively,MB◦A : U → O is 12ε1 · ε2-LDP.
When ε1 or ε2 are greater than 2 this upper bound is worse than the bound in Theorem 19,
let alone the optimal one in Theorem 20, but otherwise this bound has little error compared
to the optimal bound and is easier to work with.
5 (Un)Trackability in RAPPOR
Equipped with a new framework to analyze tracking, we first consider one of the most
significant deployments of a differentially private mechanism, used in all Chrome copies,
and analyze its trackability. Introduced in [13], RAPPOR is a DP mechanism designed to
allow repeated collection of telemetry data from users in Chrome. This mechanism was the
starting point of this work, since some of the goals stated in the original paper indicate the
desirability of being untrackable.
Roughly speaking, RAPPOR reports a value (e.g. the homepage of a user) from a large
set. It does so with the help of a Bloom filter that initially encodes a set that contains a
single element, the desired value. A Bloom filter’s output is an all 0 array that is set to 1 at
locations corresponding to hashes of the value. The mechanism proceeds to randomly flip
bits in the Bloom filter, generating what we call the Permanent Randomization. At each
point in time when data is to be collected, the mechanism generates a report by taking a
copy of the Permanent Randomization and, again, randomly flipping bits and reporting the
resulting array. The details of the mechanism can be found in the original paper, but for
completeness we also present them in the full version of the paper.
In the paper introducing RAPPOR, the authors mention that preventing tracking of users
is an issue with their construction: “RAPPOR responses can even affect client anonymity,
when they are collected on immutable client values that are the same across all clients: if
the responses contain too many bits (e.g. the Bloom filters are too large), this can facilitate
tracking clients, since the bits of the Permanent randomized responses are correlated”. On
the other hand, when talking about the reason behind the second phase of the mechanism
execution, generating a report from the permanent randomization, they mention that “Instead
of directly reporting B′ [The Permanent Randomization] on every request, the client reports
a randomized version of B′. This modification significantly increases the difficulty of tracking
a client based on B′, which could otherwise be viewed as a unique identifier in longitudinal
reporting scenarios”. We wish to show that in our framework, using the same parameters they
used in the RAPPOR data collections, RAPPOR is more aligned with the first statement
than with the second. We analyzed RAPPOR’s untrackable parameter in the worst case
setting, which can be found in the full version of the paper. We present an analysis of the
“average case” behavior of RAPPOR.
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Estimated Percentile of the Trackability Random Varaible
We estimate the statistics of the trackabiltiy random variable for RAPPOR. In essence,
the trackability random variable is the distribution of trackability leaks that happen when
participating in the mechanism. The pure version of the untrackable bound in Definition 9 is
an upper bound on the possible values of the trackability random variable.
Formally, denote the RAPPOR mechanism by R. For k reports we define a vector of
partitions ~J = {Ji}i∈[k], where Ji = [i]. We also define two report vectors ~T = {Ti}i∈[k] and
~T ′ = {T ′i}i∈[k], where Ti is drawn from the product distribution
(
GRi (u) , GRn−i (u)
)
and all
of the T ′i are drawn from GRn (u). The trackability random variable for k reports is the value:
τ := max
{
max
i∈[b k2 c]
CTi,Ji , max
i∈[b k2 c]
CT ′
i
,Ji
}
, where CT,J is:
CT,J :=
∣∣∣∣∣∣ln Pr
[
GRn (u) = T
]
Pr
[
GR|J| (u) = TJ
]
· Pr
[
GRn−|J| (u) = TJ{
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
The random variable τ is the maximum measured tracking for the
⌊
k
2
⌋
cases where the
reports are generated by two users and the
⌊
k
2
⌋
cases where the reports are generated by one
user. In our setting a mechanism should protect against both types of cases.
The measures of interest are percentiles of the trackability random variable distribution.
We estimate the median and the 90th percentile of the trackability random variable. The full
version of the paper presents the details of the estimation process.
Figure 1, in Appendix B, shows the estimated median and 90th percentile of the Track-
ability random variable for between 2 and 15 reports, and their respective 95% confidence
interval. Our estimation shows that RAPPOR’s trackability random variable’s median is
better than the worst case trackability, but reaches high values, around 5 after as few as 10
reports. The 90th percentile is worse, reaching trackability of 5 after as little as 7 reports.
6 Bitwise Everlasting Privacy Mechanism
We present a mechanism for collecting statistics about the distribution of a single bit in
the population, in such a way that everlasting privacy is maintained. Our mechanism is a
permanent state one, using a state that consists of a noisy copy of the private bit. At each
report, the user sends a noisy version of the state, effectively sending a doubly noisy version of
their private bit. We show the mechanism achieves good accuracy, and reasonable everlasting
privacy. Since this mechanism is a permanent state mechanism, we can use Theorem 13 to
give a less than reasonable upper bound on the untrackable parameter of this mechanism.
We show, however a lower bound of the untrackable parameter of this mechanism that is not
far off from the upper bound in Theorem 13.
Consider the mechanism where each user holds one bit, b. First they generate a permanent
randomization, b′ = b ⊕ x, where x ∼ Ber
(
1
eε1+1
)
. Then at each report they generate a
report bit, r = b′ ⊕ y, where y ∼ Ber
(
1
eε2+1
)
. The aggregator receives these reports from
all users and invokes the frequency oracle to output an estimate:
p˜0 =
eε1+ε2 + 1− (eε1 + 1) (eε2 + 1)∑i∈[n] ri
(eε1 − 1) (eε2 − 1)
and p˜1 = 1− p˜0. Let p˜ be the vector whose coordinates are p˜0 and p˜1. Let p be the vector of
true frequencies.
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Privacy, Accuracy and Trackability
Bitwise Everlasting Privacy is ε1-EDP, outputs p˜ such that with probability 1− β:∥∥p˜− p∥∥∞ ≤ (ε1 + 2) (ε2 + 2)ε1 · ε2
√
32 ln (2/β)
n
and is
⌊
k
2
⌋
ε2-Untrackable, but no better than k2 ε2 − ε1 − ln 2-Untrackable. The proof of
these claims can be found in the full version of the paper.
7 Report Noisy Inner Product
In this section we present a method for collecting statistics about users’ data when it is
encoded in a vector of d bits. This mechanism allows us to solve the heavy hitters or
histograms problems, while maintaining everlasting privacy. This solution achieves good
accuracy with high probability and is effectively untrackable with high probability, but only
for a “not so large” number of reports (where “not so large” is approximately the square
root of the number of vectors in the state).
The “delta” part of the untrackable bound of this solution can be small, but most likely
not cryptographically small. While in Differential Privacy one should make sure the “delta”
part is cryptographically small, it is not clear whether or not the same requirement applies
to the framework of tracking.
The construction of this mechanism follows a general transformation from a Locally
Differential Privacy mechanism to an Everlasting Privacy mechanism with certain trackability
parameters: memorize a fixed number (L) of executions of a local privacy preserving
computation. At each collection the mechanism mimics one of these stored executions,
choosing one of them at random. Everlasting Privacy is maintained by the finite access to
a user’s data: only L total different executions are ever available to the adversary. On the
other hand, in terms of trackability, as long as no two different stored execution are played,
there is no difference between one user and two users. No guarantees are given if the same
stored execution is chosen twice.
In our instantiation of this idea, Report Noisy Inner Product is based on creating a
state that contains random d-bit vectors as well as their noisy inner product with the user’s
private value.
In this setting there are n users. Let:
ε′ := ε
2
√
2L ln
( 1
δ
) .
At initialization, every user i, with private value ui ∈ {0, 1}d chooses L random vectors
{vi,j}j∈[L], vi,j ∈ {0, 1}d \ {~0}, and L noisy bits {xi,j}j∈[L] such that xi,j ∼ Ber
(
1
eε′+1
)
and
calculates bi,j = 〈vi,j , ui〉 ⊕ xi,j .
At each time of collection, every user j picks at random a vector from the state generated in
the previous step. That is, they choose one of the vi’s generated before and the corresponding
result of the inner product si. They then send it to the server. We refer to the report user i
sends at a given collection time as (Vi, Bi) (i.e. the vector and the noisy inner product). The
aggregator receives these reports from all users and invokes the frequency oracle to output
an estimate:
p˜u :=
2d − 1
2dn
eε
′ + 1
eε′ − 1
∑
i∈[n]
(−1)〈Vi, u〉⊕Bi + 12d .
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Since we never choose the vector ~0 as one of the vectors of the state, we introduce a
small bias to the probability that a report will agree with any other value than the one used
to generate it. This bias is corrected by the multiplicative 2d−12d factor and the additive
1
2d
factor, resulting in an unbiased estimator.
Let p be the entire true frequency vector and p˜ as the entire estimated frequency vector.
7.1 Privacy, Accuracy and Trackability
The mechanism Report Noisy Inner Product (RNIP) maintains (ε, δ)-Approximate Everlast-
ing Privacy, outputs p˜ such that with probability 1− β:
∥∥p˜− p∥∥∞ ≤ ε′ + 2ε′
√
8 ln(2d+1/β)
n
= O
(√
ln(2d+1/β) ln(1/δ)L
nε2
)
.
And it is
(
0, k2L +
L2
2d
)
-untrackable for k reports.
The proofs of these claims can be found in the full version of the paper and are similar to
the analysis in [16].
7.2 Parameter Selection
When deploying this mechanism, the significant parameters considered are the everlasting
privacy and desired accuracy. In our setting we have n users and our data consists of values
that can be encoded into d bits. Assume we wish to have everlasting privacy (ε, δ) and
accuracy α with probability 1 − β. By the results of the accuracy analysis, the required
value of the Differential Privacy parameter of every report, which we denoted ε′, needs to be
at least
2
√
2 ln(2d+1/β)
α · √n−√2 ln(2d+1/β) .
For most interesting settings we can assume that α > 2
√
2 ln(2d+1/β)
n , which allows us to
choose ε′ = 4α
√
2 ln(2d+1/β)
n . Once we have ε′ we can say that the mechanism needs to have a
state of size at most L =
⌊
ε2
8ε′2 ln(1/δ)
⌋
. This means that the mechanism is
(
0, k2L
)
-Untrackable
for k reports.
To summarize, if we were to require (ε, δ)-Everlasting Privacy and α accuracy with
probability at least 1− β, then for k reports we can guarantee:(
0, O˜
(
k2
α2ε2n
))
-Untrackable.
where the O˜ hides the logarithmic factors in the relaxation parameter for differential privacy
δ, the failure probability β and the size of the vectors d.
8 Conclusions and Open Problems
The issue of using differentially private mechanisms in order to track users is a newly
formulated problem. While avoiding tracking is very natural, it has not been investigated
before in a formal manner. The notion of Everlasting Privacy is very tempting, and indeed,
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some companies implemented and deployed it. But Everlasting Privacy should be handled
with caution; We have shown that one such deployment of Everlasting Privacy left much to
be desired in terms of the untrackable parameter. The risks of tracking are real, and as such
every mechanism deployed to a user base must try to prevent it as much as it can.
Many questions concerning tracking are open and the results presented here should be
treated as a preliminary investigation. The most important one is how do you combine the
constraints on accuracy and on everlasting differential privacy to produce a lower bound on
the untrackable parameter. In particular, are the schemes of Sections 6 and 7 the best one
can hope for, or are there better mechanisms? One downside of the scheme of Section 7 is
the rapid deterioration in the untrackable parameter once k reaches
√
L. Is there a scheme
with a more graceful degradation of the untrackable parameter?
The mechanisms we presented are permanent state mechanisms. Perhaps mechanisms
which transform the state between executions can achieve better untrackable parameter
bounds? Doing such a construction is delicate, since if not done correctly one of two things
might happen:
1. The Differential Privacy guarantee will decline the more the state alters.
2. The accuracy will decline, as many different inputs might converge to the same states
over time.
But perhaps a clever construction of a mechanism that transforms its state can achieve
a much better untrackable parameter bound for given Differential Privacy and accuracy
requirements.
Also, perhaps everlasting privacy is an unreasonable demand. A mechanism that achieves
privacy for many executions, but not for infinite executions, can be very suitable for practical
purposes as well. If so, how can we extend these results to these “long-lasting” privacy
mechanisms?
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A Proofs for Section 3
A.1 Proof of Theorem 14
First, we properly define the composition of m mechanisms, {Mi}i∈[m]. In our setting a user
generate m report streams using the m mechanisms. Namely, each Mi was used to generate
ki reports. Let the sum of all ki’s be k. Let M̂ be the composition of all the Mi’s. Formally,
M̂ will first generate k1 reports from the report stream generator of M1, it will then continue
to generate k2 reports from the report stream generator of M2, and so on, until all k reports
were generated. Let the indices of the reports generated by Mi be Ji, i.e. J1 = {1, ..., k1},
J2 = {k1 + 1, ..., k1 + k2}, and so on. Notice that the probability that GM̂k , on input u, will
generate a report stream t of k reports is exactly:
Pr
[
GM̂k (u) = t
]
=
∏
i∈[m]
Pr
[
GMiki (u) = tJi
]
since all mechanisms Mi are executed independently.
We are now ready to prove Theorem A.1.
Proof. In the definition of untrackable, we consider whether a set of reports were generated
by a single user or two, according to any partition. To prove that the composition mechanism
is (γ′,mδ + δ′)-untrackable we will prove that the bound in the definition holds for every
partition possible.
Consider the partition P = {P1, P2} of all the reports generated by M̂ , where P1 are the
reports associated with the first user and P2 are the reports associated with the second. We
will split this partition into partitions for each mechanism separately. Namely, for every Mi
we define a partition P i =
{
P i1, P
i
2
}
, such that each P i1 = P1 ∩ Ji and similarly for P i2. The
partition P i is exactly the partition on reports generated by Mi induced by P . Notice that
we allow P i1 (or P i2) to be empty.
Consider new mechanisms {Fi}i∈[m]. that each receives as input a bit b. For every
Fi, If b = 0 the mechanism outputs a stream generated by one copy of Mi, and if b = 1
the mechanism outputs a stream generated by two independent copies of Mi according to
partition Pi. If either P i1 or P i2 are empty, the output Fi will not depend on its input b. If the
Mi’s are (γ, δ)-untrackable then the Fi’s are (γ, δ)-differentially private. This allows us to use
Advanced Composition for differential privacy (Theorem 4) to say that them-fold composition
of all of the Fi’s is (γ′,mδ + δ′)-differentially private for γ′ as is in the theorem statement.
Notice that conditioned on all mechanisms receiving input 1, the output product distribution
over reports is identical to the case where all reports, for each mechanism, were generated
by two users. Similarly if all inputs are 0, the output product distribution over reports is
identical to the case where all reports, for each mechanism, were generated by one user. This
implies that the composition of the original Mi’s, M̂ , is (γ′,mδ + δ′)-untrackable. J
A.2 Proof of Theorem 16
Proof. The proof for this theorem is very intuitive. Since the mechanism is γ-untrackable
for k reports, it is also γ-untrackable for fewer reports. This teaches us that by paying no
more than γ we can reduce the question of being untrackable for n users to the question of
being untrackable for n− 1 users. Continuing this until we have 2 users costs us (n− 2) γ to
the untrackable parameter, resulting in a total of (n− 1) γ untrackable.
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Formally, we prove this by induction. Assume that a mechanismM is (t− 1) γ-untrackable
for t users for k reports. We wish to prove that the mechanism M is tγ-untrackable for t+ 1
users for k reports. The base case, t = 2, follows directly from the fact that the mechanism
is γ-untrackable for k reports.
If the mechanism M is γ-untrackable for k reports, then it is γ-untrackable for fewer
reports as well. We denote Pr [A] := Pr
[
GM|A| (u) ∈ TA
]
. Notice that for all user data u ∈ U ,
all partitions P = {Pi}i∈[t+1] of [k] into t+ 1 parts and all output stream sets T ⊆ Rk:∏
j∈[t+1]
Pr [Pj ] = Pr [P1] · Pr [P2] ·
∏
j∈[t+1]\{1,2}
Pr [Pj ]
≤ eγPr [P1 ∪ P2]
∏
j∈[t+1]\{1,2}
Pr
[
GM|Pj | (u) ∈ TPj
]
≤ etγPr [GMk (u) ∈ T ]
Where the first inequality is due to the mechanism being γ-untrackable for |P1|+ |P2| reports
and the second inequality is due to the induction hypothesis.
Similarly, in the other direction:
Pr
[
GMk (u) ∈ T
] ≤ e(t−1)γPr [P1 ∪ P2] ∏
j∈[t+1]\{1,2}
Pr [Pj ]
≤ etγPr [P1] · Pr [P2] ·
∏
j∈[t+1]\{1,2}
Pr [Pj ]
= etγ
∏
j∈[t+1]
Pr [Pj ]
Where the first inequality is due to the induction hypothesis and the second inequality is
due to the mechanism being γ-untrackable for |P1|+ |P2| reports. J
A.3 Proof of Theorem 17
Proof. The proof for this is also rather intuitive. Theorem 13 teaches us that we can exchange
the probability that two sets of reports, of size totaling k′, originated from two users to the
probability they originated from one user by paying no more than
⌊
k′
2
⌋
ε in the untrackable
parameter. By combining pairs of users, we can use this to reduce the question of being
untrackable for n users to the question of untrackable for
⌈
n
2
⌉
users, by paying no more than⌊
k
2
⌋
ε. By repeating this process dlogne − 1 times we can reduce the question of untrackable
for n users to the question of untrackable for 2 users, by paying no more than dlogne⌊k2 ⌋ε.
Formally, we prove this by induction. Assume that the mechanism is dlog te⌊k2 ⌋γ-
untrackable for t users for k reports. We wish to prove that the mechanism is dlog (t+ 1)e⌊k2 ⌋γ-
untrackable for t+ 1 users for k reports. The base case t = 2 follows directly from the fact
that the mechanism is γ-untrackable for k reports.
Assume t is odd. The proof is very similar when it is even, but for simplicity we will
only show it for odd values of t. We denote ` := dlog (t+ 1)e and use the same notation for
Pr [A] as before. Notice that for all user data u ∈ U , all partitions P = {Pi}i∈[t+1] of [k]
into t+ 1 parts and all output stream sets T ⊆ Rk:
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∏
j∈[t+1]
Pr [Pj ] =
∏
j∈[ t+12 ]
Pr [P2j ] · Pr [P2j+1]
≤
∏
j∈[ t+12 ]
e
⌊ |P2j∪P2j+1|
2
⌋
γ
Pr [P2j ∪ P2j+1]
≤ eb k2 cγ
∏
j∈[ t+12 ]
Pr [p2j ∪ P2j+1]
≤ e`b k2 cγPr [GMk (u) ∈ T ]
Where the first inequality is due to Theorem 13 and the third inequality is due to the
induction hypothesis.
Similarly, for the other direction:
Pr
[
GMk (u) ∈ T
] ≤ e(`−1)b k2 cγ ∏
j∈[ t+12 ]
Pr [P2j ∪ P2j+1]
≤ e`b k2 cγ
∏
j∈[ t+12 ]
Pr [P2j ] · Pr [P2j+1]
= e`b k2 cγ
∏
j∈[t+1]
Pr [Pj ]
Where the first inequality is due to the induction hypothesis and the second inequality is
due to Theorem 13. J
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Figure 1 Growth of the estimated median and 90th percentile of the trackability random variable
of RAPPOR as a function of the number of reports.
